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ABSTRACT
This paper examines Philippine comparative advantage in
rice production and whether government policies encourage the
rice sector to exploit its advantage°
Rice production has grown at 6°0 percent annually in
1970s. This growth has been due to yield increases from newer
modern varieties and more fertilizer and to increases in
irrigated area° Government policies have contributed to growth
principally through irrigation investments.
Irrigation is heavily subsidized but other price policies
tax producers° Domestic rice prices are slightly below world
prices and most input prices are above world levels. The distortion
in net incentives however is not large° The net effect of government
policy is to provide slightly positive protection for irrigated farms
(3.6%) and slightly negative protection for rainfed farms (-4.7%).
Rice production on both rainfed and irrigated environments is
socially profitable in 1979. Although yields are higher on irrigated
fields costs per unit of rice output are similar in rainfed systems°
Government policies reduce private profitability in rainfed farms,
but in social terms these farms are quite competitive. A comparison
of the DRC for irrigated rice with the 1974 estimate of Herdt and
Lacsina (1976) shows that rising yields have increased Philippine
comparative advantage in rice. Future comparative advantage will
depend on the relative growth of yields and irrigation costs.
If capital cost per new hectare irrigated continues to grow at past
rates, yields will have to increase at least 2°8 percent annually to
maintain current comparative advantage°
Although the Philippines has a comparative advantage in rice
production, exports were unprofitable for the government marketing
agency in 1977 to 1979. Government control of exports puts a barrier
between world and domestic markets so that world quality premiums
are not reflected in domestic prices. The domestic milling industry
therefore has no incentive to become competitive in higher quality
international markets. Inelastic demand for low-quality Philippine
rice on world markets then limits profitable exports. If private
traders were allowed to export, they should be able to respond to
world market incentives to produce and export good quality rice at
a profit.
C4_ING ODMPABATIgE A_WAWn_E IN PHILIR_
RICE _O1"
L_J: Unr_vehr and AiM. Balisac_n**
Philippine rice product/on has grown re_rMahly in _-_e last fifteen
years. Production grew at an average annual rate of 5.3 percent between 1965
and 1980 and total .c_c_uctzon doubled from 2.5 million bo 5.0 mi/lion tons of
aulled rice. _ in supply has _ growth in _ 80 that the
Philipp_r_s had e_Dor_hle sctrpluses a_ _t re_bl rice prices
1977 and 1982.
Philippine rice _olicy in the 1960s and early 1970s _-used on bc%ffering
consumers fmmm fluctuations in prc_tion and w3rld pric_s. Gm;_mment
efforts to promote preduction were _:c_ed by crop failures and rising world
prices in t/_eearly 1970s. SuLx_ms in reachi_ dmmest/c self-mlfficiency in
tk_ late 1970s raise_ a new policy issue. Can the Philippin_w export rice
p_ofitably? The an_ to this q_estion depe_ on whether the Philip@ines
has a cc_ti_ advantage in rice proc_om and whether go_rmm_t policies
will. encourage the tic8 set'cot to exploit that advantage.
This papar examimes the evidence _/_c]ing Phillppiae oc_ti%_
advantage in rice _on. It begins with a review of the 8o_%roes of
growth in pr_on. An, examination of the impact of governmem_ policies on
inoanti_ and past growth in rice proci_=hlon follc_s. Than current Social
_-and returns in rice product/on are:msmsuxed with deta frcm the IRRI 1979
w_t ssason _ of 149 Cemtral Lu=on farsexs. Social profitability is
e_ted for eight rice farming systems classified by type of cropland, i.e.
,
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rai_ed, One-crop_rrigated,and _ irrigated,andby ._ of powerin
preparationand th_hing. _zdt and Imm_ina(1976)m_mared social
profitability in Philippine rio8 pr_ in 1974. A comparison of their
[974 results with (mlrfindings shows that cuBpazative adva_ has increased
due to technical c_ and provides some indication about the future
determinants of Rli!ippi_e cc_%_Lrati%_a_vantaqe in l-ice.
Rice _ction grew at 6.0 percen% annually _ the first and
se_mnd half of the 1970s (Table I). This growth is primarily the reeult uf
the 5.2 percent ammua/ increase in yields. Total arma only _ at 0.8
pemcent annually. _ growth in _ion is disaggregated into growth of
arma and yield for cropland types, it is clear that _ in ylelds on
irrigated land has been the principal source of pr__% increase, f_llc_d
by grcwth in yields on rainfed land, and the _ in irrigated area.
Only a small part of yield growth is d_e to the first _m ad_stion of
m_n_ varieties (MVs). Sixty percent of _ rice area was alre_ _ulanted
to M_s in the early 1970s and t_hisincreased _mmwhat to 72 percent by the
late 1970s. Fertilizer use on rice grew fr_n 27.7 kilogramm to 37.7 k_l(_rams
NPK per hectare in the same period. If an a_ditional kilo_m of fertilizer
i0 kilogramsof pa4_yon a_rage, then h_ fertilizer _se
ao_unts for about o_-third of the growth in yields.
of the yield increase is due to the imp_ pro_uctlvlty of nemar
MVs on both.irrigated and rainfed land. The older MVs, IR8 and IR20, were
r_xmsive to fertilizer on irrigated fields, _t _are not.z_sistauf_to pests
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and disease or tmlerant of _oistu_e stress. ]_36, _ in 1976, was the
first short _uration variety. _t mztures in only i!0 _ysw c_ with 135
days for IRS. Thisallc_se_ doub_,_ in irrigatedand.ere
fauored rainfed enviromB_nts, and thus contributed to incremses in ares.
Furthe_T,ore, IR36 is resistant _ insect pasts and disease so that there ha_
been no widespread crop failures si._ceits in__-T/_. IR42, released in
1977, and IR50, raleaae_ in 1980, are _Jolerantto m_isture stre_s and
soil conditions and _fore _ _ on rainfed farms. N3_ar M_s are more
__e _ farmer's fields because they m_tt_e early, _ drought tolerant,
a_K_pest resistant (_ix Table i ). Technical cha_ge in the form of
i__ variehies has been the principal scmroe of growth in Philippine rioe
p_/ction.
The grcw_/_in su4_iy led to a _cline in _ _ frum 1960 tm 1980,
altho_h trade and _tion fl_tuat_ in individual years (Table 2).
S_gply m_sined ro%_hly 5 percent £_._r%. of self-sufficienc_ in the 1960S
(Apiraksirikuls 1976), as production _ b_hin_ p3_xilation_. Tae 20
percent decline in p_oduction from 1972 to 1974 due to p_st an_ ty_ ¢%_-_g_
recovered in i_74. As population growth slo_d and p_c_ton growth
_interrupted, _lippi_e ric_ supply re_che_ d_mestic self-_ficle-_c_ in
1977. Smsll [_t _n_ a_ounts of rice _ ex_ted be_en 1977 and 1982.
The i_ort_u_e, of different pri0e policy ir__ts h_s chamged with
t_e growth in production. D_ri_ the 1960s the Rice and ODrn A£]_inlstzation
(RC_) %w_ully purchased less than 2 percent of prediction (_able 2).
_t msrMet inte__ntion primarily took the fon_ of dlshursem_t of
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Table 2. Rice proc_ion, internatim%_J, l:xada, _ _,_t maz_t
_merventicm" in the P_il_s (000 _ rica).
Crop Production Net Proma'e- O_sbur_e- Cha_ge
year imports merits remits in
govt,
srx_/cs
1962/63 2578.6 256,2 156.5 366.0 46,7
1963/64 2497.9 299.9 26.4 311.6 14.6
1964/65 2596.4 569.2 2.1 402.3 !69_0
1965/66 264.7.2 108.2 22.9 2..52.9 -121,
•1966/67 2661.I 238.6 56.I 150.4 144,2
1967/68 2964.5 -40_3 151.6 29.6 81.7
1968169 2d89,i -0.5 145,3 169.0 -24,i
1969/70 3401.7 * 50_! 60,1 -]i,0
1970/71 3472.9 369.3 2.1 108.7 79,2
1971/72 3315,I 440.i O.4 541.3 24°5
1972/73 2869°5 308.1 4.8 252.2 81.9
1973/74 3636.2 169.3 22..0 189.8 37.0
1.974/75 3679,0 145.3 95.9 238,2 3.!
1975/76 4003.7 55.2 163.9 259.I -40.0
1976/77 4196.5 15.6 273,9 19S.8 90.6
1977/78 4481.7 -13.4 451.5 136.7 267.5
1978/79 4678.i --38.0 423.I 74.7 183.7
1979/80 5093_4 -236,0 403°i 268.2 -Ill,5
1980/81 5020.0 -175.0 280.5 255.! -149.5
=
Sources: Productiondata are from BAFo_,
Diet:_o_ are from proozremnr.sand, d.__m._
from I_A.
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umports in cons_ng c_nters. The R_A was replaced by the National Grain
Authority (NGA), r_ National Fcc_ _Drity (_A), in 1972. Toe NFA
increased pr_ts, purchasing at least 5 percent of the increased
production since 1977. With growing _km_.stic s_ies, the government's role
_n disbursame/_t declined. The task is nu_ to dispose of _a_q31_ pro_tion
thL_c_h exports m_d _eased go%_br_nt stock _idi_Ig.
eov m nt r oli
Impact on Product Prices
twin goals _ Philippine rice policy are to provide mmmmerati_
prices for producers and ?_ provide steady. 8u_lies of rice at stable prices
_fordable by low income households. Official floor and ceiling prices are
arz_unced that pz_sum_y reflec_ these goals. T_ imstr_nts are used to
implement rice price policy: a gover_t monopoly on international trade and
domestic market c_ations in d_fense of official prices. The sucessful
defense of official pric_s ultimately _epencls cm interrmtiom_l trade, since
any 4_.ficit m_st be supplied t_Jgh imports and any suzlalus disf_ of
thro_h exports. Year-to-year char_es in stocks ba_ been tara!! (Table 2), so
tha_ control of trade hag been the principal means of controlling _tic
supply and prioss.
This section examines tw_ issues. First, has government tra_e oontrol
c_used domestic rice prices to divarge from w_rld prices? World prices
r_oresent the _0cial qoportunity cost of rice to the _stic economy.
Therefore it is of interest to m_._ure how far policy has caused domestic
price incentives to differ from social prices. Seoond, have government
actions maintained domestic prices at official price le%_/s? If official
prices represent govei_nt goals, then a c_mparison of actual and official
prices meas_ whether government has _ret its price policy objectives.
Since the Philippines has normally imported during the last 20 years,
the impact of trade controls on dcmsstic prices c_n be measured best by a
cclmparison of prices in Manila, the principal port and constm_ing center,
with CIF prices. The average nominal protection coefficient (NPC), defined
here as the ratio of Manila wholesale prices bo CIF unit values or Thai
prices, is close to 1.00 for the period 1960 to 1980. Domestic prices have
generally follc_d the trend of %Drld prices in the last two decades {Table
3 and Figure 1), but tended to be above %Drld prices in the 1960s and below
in the late 1970s.The a_rage NPC for 1960 to 1970 is 1.15 and declines to
0.99 for 1977 to 1981.
The control on imported _antities caused domestic prices to be above
world prices in the 1960s, ever. though official ceiling prices w_re at or
below world price levels. _om 1964 to !970 domestic market prices ware
above world prices. Only in 1962 rand 1963 we_re i_%0orts sufficient to keep
dumestic prices below world prices. Therefore actual domestic market
prices ware usually above the ceilir_] price. Only in 1968 and 1969 were
drm_stic supplies adequate to keep ck_estic prices close_ to the ceiling
price. 1 Go%_rnment-contro!led imports in the 1960s __re not usually
large enough to hold domestic prices at either world or official levels,
with the result that dcmestic prices favored producers slightly over
con_s.
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Table 3= O0mparJ_onof _rZd _d da_esticrice prices (IV-%_.
Thai _azila Retail _Izzila Manila Caiiln_ Manila CentralCI}"
(FOB) FOB ,_.!_le- ceiling _. _- wbblzsale
value 357: sale price CiF Thai CIF ceiling ,
brok_%_ floor
1960 (0.28) .20 .36 36 1.29 1.80 1.29 1.00 1.16
i961 * .20 .45 .36 2.25 - 1.25 1.37
1962 0.Z_ ._@ /41 ,36 0_93 1,03 0.82 I 14 0.96
1963 0,50 .43a .47 +36 0.94 i,09 0.72 1.31 1,00
1964 0.45 .44a .57 .34 1.27 1,30 0.75 1.66 1_18
1.965 0,44 .45a .55 Z_ 1.25 1,22 1.05 I 20 1.14
1966 0.51 ,53a .67 55 1.31 1.26 1.08 122 1.03
!967 0.58 ,55a ._8 ,59 i.17 I.24 I.02 I.L5 i.08
1968 (0.63) .57 ,64 .59 i.02 I.,12 0.94 1 08 0_97
1969 * .55 _60 .59 i.09 - I.(_ 0.97
1970 * .65a .72 .59 I:Ii - I,22 I.02
1971 0.54 .55 .91 .59 1o69 1.65 1,09 1,54 1.22
1972 0,85 .71a 1.35 ]_07 1.35 1.62 1.26 1.07 1.20
1973 2.24 1.75a i,31 i,33 0.58 0.75 0,59 0.98 LOT
1974 3.35 3.37a 1.97 i,86 0.58 0.58 0.56 1,06 1,17
,'975 2.21 2.20a 2.O3 1,90 0,94 0.95 0.86 I.!0 0.96
_976 i.66 i_72_- I.99 2.02 I.20 i.16 i.22 0,99 i.05
1977 (2.06)!.67 2.05 2.10 1.00 1,00 1.26 0.97 1.04
i97S (2.28>2.35 !.96 2.10 0.86 0.83 0.92 0.93 1.03
19'79 (2.02)2.19 2_14 2.2-5 1.06 0,98 1.17 0.91 0.86
1980 (2.22)2.91 2.29 2.51 1.03 0.79 1.13 0.91 0.90
19S1 2.61 2.75 0.95 0.99
Average 1960-1970 1,15 1.32 0.96 1.20 1,08
Average 197i-i_0 1,03 1.03 1.Of 1.04 1.04
Average 1977-1981 0.99 0.90 i.12 0.93 0.96
Average 1960-1981 !_0g !.12 0.99 h12 1.06
Source,s: CIF (FOB)Values are fromData Seriesc_nRice $tarlsticsin the Philippines(Tsble_I)
for 1963-67and 1971-73. _Z yesrs fro__%B_prices are from Rice Committee
_rd of Trade,"[nailand Manila%T_lesaleprices are collectedby CentralBank.
Ceilingand floor prices are from _NlZA. C_tral imzon (Cabanacuan)wholesale_es
are collectedby BAEcon.
_Cen percentadded as estimate of tralsportccs_s in order to e?prc_ci_tethe CIF price,
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Philippine production _eclined in 1972 and 1973 while %Drld prices
rose mmrply d_eto global production shortfalls. The newly organized NGA
implemented rationing and subsidized imports :in 1973-75 (Apiraksirikul,
1976)o Even though domestic prices rose above ceiling prioes in 1974-75,
they w_re still 40 percent below world price levels. Domestic prices
follc_gd the rising trend of world prices hot a combination of subsidized
imports and domestic rationing were sufficient to buffer domestic prices
from the ahnonm_lly high world prices in 1974.
Sinoe 1976, 8_Dplies ha_e been adequate to keep @nmestic co_
prices b_low ceiling prices and to export substantial quantities in 1980
and 1981. _tic producer prices have now fallen below the official
floor price, so that price policy impl_tation now favors consumers over
producers .2 _ relationship of 6k,_estic prices to w3rld prioss is
imclear. Dcmestic prices have been about equal to export unit values slnoe
•1977, hut have been below _hai FOB prices for c_parable quality (Table 3).
i_w quality exports in 1979 and 1980 w_re sold at prices %_i1 belc_ the
Thai spot price. In spite of these low prices, considerable 9Dvernme_t stocks
accu_.ulated that could _t he exported. Furthermore, the go_
reportedly lost P90 million in export subeidies between 1977 and 1979
(Business Day, July, 1982), in part becuase rice _s separated and gra_ to
meet quality standards.
There is an apparent contradiction between an NPC of 1.0 or less and the
existence of export subsidies and unexportable surpluses. There are two
reasons for this contradictory evidence regardlng Philippine export
capability. First, it seen_s likely that the world market cannot absorb low
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quality Philippine exports at the Thai 35 percent hro_sr_ price. In general
world demand for low quality rice is less elastic than _mmad for high quality
rice. Recently the world maxket for low grade rice may ha%_ been softer than
_n/al. Indonesia has been the steadiest buyer of low grac_ rioe (S<m_x_,
[975),• but Indonesian _ports dropped sharply from over 2 million tDns in 1980
to (me-half million in 1981 (t_DA). W_rld _ for low quality rice is st
perfectly elastic for Phiiip_ine e_0orts, and the mA_inal export price is
Icwer than the Thai spot price.
The second and most impor_nt reason for the poor. profitability of
exports is the insulation of dumestic markets from world market standards.
[
The quality factors that determine prices _n world markets differ from those
that determine prices in domestic _mrkets. Mmet domestic rice _eS bet_sen 25
ar_ 45 peroent broMsr_, b_t this _ is not an _ detm_{_t of
prioecn u,19 0).on worldmarkets, thepriceof 35xcent
brokens varied from 61 to 13 percent below the price of 5 psroent
during the 19705.
Because exports are controlled by the go_srnmmnt, world quality premiums
are not reflected in d_mestic prices. _he domestic milling in_ therefore
has no incentiv_ to becume competitive in h/gher quality international
markets. The result has been subsidies f_r high quality e_x)rts and build-up
of govex_msnt stocks. These intervemt/ons ha%_ raise_ prio_ abov_ what they
%_uld haw been under autarky, hut they are an expem_i%_ may of disposing of
the domestic surplus. If private ex_orts were all_e_d, w_rld qualityprocures
_uld be reflected in 4_m_stic prices and Philippine e_ could become
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eogpetiti_ on w_rld markets. Tois _ould reduce the.cost of _intainin 9
_roducer incentives o
In summ_ry, the echievez_nt of price policy objectives, as m_asured by
official prices_ has been fairly succ_ssfui, _it quantities imported or
exported haw usually been inadequate to _x_pletely hold official prices.
Thus actual retail prices were _ ceiling, pri_s in importing l_ars and
producex prices were below floor prices in escorting years. GDWexJmuent
osntrol of trade in the current period of dm_-tic surplus _ qt_antity
tra_ through re_ing dK_estic incenti_m_S to pro_e high quality rice for
export.
_tic rice prices ha_ follcx_d the lor_]-run trend of %prld prices.
C_m_rnment actions have insulated domestic markets fr=m the variability in
world rice markets, wilt introducing any _, major distortion in
pri_. The h_Cs do show a shift frcx_ a slight prod_zer bias in the 1960s
to a slight co_ bias in the late 1970s, probably d_e in part to the
changing costs of implementing policy. Maintainirz/ ceilir_ prices .has
bec=me less costly as d_m_stic supply has grown while it has
increasingly expensiv_ to maintain floor pric_s because of limited
opportunities for profitable exports.
Impact on Input Prices and Value Added
The domestic price of rice has been declining relative to world prices
since. 1978. The net effect of go%_r_nt policies on producer incentives,
_ver, also de..penclson the pric_s of production inputs. GDvelnment
_pe_itures on irrigation, credit, and fertilizez increased _haxply in the
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_rly 1970s in response to _he crop failures in 1972 to 1974_ %_e goal cf
expenditures was to _ncrease _.ion through enucuzagi_ further
_dc_tion of the nm_ rice technology. Fertilizer and credit policies became
less favorable to products after ckDestic production r_. This section
examines the recent history of government policies with respmct to inputs and
measures the effecti_ rate of protection for rice prodLw_,_o_.
!rriqat/on.. Irrigation investments increase the potent/al
prcdt_tivity of land, not only because irrigation allows control o%_arwater
and _)uble cr_ng, but because it is csmplemsntary to the use of fertilizer.
Natlo,al a_age yiel_ are .6 tons higher On irrigated _ than on rainfed
land. The difference is more dramatic amDng Central _ _ _ by
in 1979. Irrigated farms obtained 1.2 tons mDre rice in the wet season,
plus an additional 2.5 tons af production in the dry season. Thus irrigation
has a suhatantial impact on potential yield and private returns.
Annual _rnment expenditures for irrigation gr_ at 40 percent
a/_ly bet-_n 1965 and 1980, from P4 million to P!,972 million.3 The
cost of irrigation in_sstmant per hectare has been rising as m_re difficult
projects are _n. K_i and Rmyami (1978- 1982) estimate that the
cost per new hectare irrigated rose from an average of P847 in the 1960s to an
a,_erageof P2884 in the 1970s. Irrigation costs par hectare have been rising
at I0 percent annually during the 1970s.
The _t bears all irrigation investmm_t costs ar_ _ uperating
costs. Official irrigation fees in the.Philippines are P374 _er hectare and
actua/ collection is _t _ (App_mdix table 2). For gravity
•.di_xsion, the most c_mmn system in the Philippines, the value of collected
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_t_esis only 14 _t of the annual crestscf irrigation per hectare, and
-_bus_ sui_idy is 86 percent (Table 4)4 _ s_mBic%i_sfor
,rrigation s%_stantia!ly increase private profitability for fammars with
_:-rigate_lar_, both a_.ly through re_m_cion of pri_ate costs and
_ndirectly t_h the increase in potential yiel4M.
Fertilizer: Use of inorganic fertilizer is an im_t c_ of
_he r_w rio8 technology. Central IAtzonfarmers sur_ in 197_ applied 57 to
92 kilograms of nitroge_ per hectare and fertilizer _ _ 20 percent
of the variable costs of production. _ the fertilizer price can he
expected to ha%_ an imp_Wcant influer_ _ pr_on and pm0flts.
_t fertilizer policy Ln the 1970s _- at_ to serve the
conflictirg goals of providing incentives to the domestic fertilizer inc]ustry
to promote self-sufficiency While also providimg cheap inputs for f_
production° From 1973 to 1975 a t_-tier price syste_ _ms imp!emmnted to
insulate food proch_ers from high w_rld fertilfzer prioes. A subsidy was paid
to fertil.%zer_./h_uortex_ to cover losaes, and fertilizer _as
distributed through the gD__rnment credit IA-Dgramat roughly half the wDrld
price.
In !976 wQrld fert/lizex prices d_ and fert/lizer pri_ ware
unified domestically. A cash subsidy cont_ to be [mid to ¢kmsetic
fertilizer producers to re_ them for selli_ fertilizer at Official
prioss° Other authors (David and Balisa_can,1981; Te and fferdt,1982) have
shown that producers pay fertilizer p_ioes at or ahov_ w_rld le__ls _nd the
subsidy accrues to fertilizer,man_facturers. Farmars pai(lan a%_rage implicit
tariff of 23 percent on urea and 44 percent on amm_ul in 1978 (Table 4).
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Table 4. Implicit tariffs on rice production inputs, F%il£ppines, 1978.
Input implicit tariffa/
(percent)
Ur ea_b/ 23
Ammosulb/ 44
Insecticides and herbicides-d/ 28
Irrigation, gravity diversion systm_ c/ -86
Irrigation pump system, 6" _ axial flo_d/ 20
Hand tractor, i0 hp_d/ 30
4-wheel tractor_ 75 hp_d/ i0
Portable thresher, axial flc_d/ i0
Large axial flow thresher _d/ IU
Fuel and lubri,canr_dd/ 21
a/Farmer's price divided by border price adjusted for transport
COSTS, mintl_ one,
--b/Ureaand a_mosul are average implicit tariffs for 1978, 1979,
1980 calculated from t'he percent difference between domestic
and border price (see David and Balisacan, 1981).
C/see Appendix Table 2.
d/Based on legal tariff rates.
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Thus fertilizer subsidies sid0e 1976 bemefit the domaetic industry _ther t_n
farmers.
Credit: In order to adcgt r_;,_Icgy , l_rg_ c_sh outlays are
t_eededthat are n_mnlly fina_ct_ through loans° _ious g{_a___T_E_stprogran_
in the 19508 and 1960s provided subsidized credit to farm_-s t_h nlral
banks and g_nmemt c_peratives (see B_/is, 1982 for a review of these
programs). The amDunt cf formal credit for rice product/on _ steadily
during the 15_0s and M_%rs, et.al., (1974) report t_t in _Jhelate 1960s
formal sources of credit a_ted for a third of t_tal pr_tion credit in
Central Luzon.
The current __t credit progrmn, Masagana-99 (M-99), %m_ launched
in I%73. The loen oons/sts of a _ae_._ of _ _unts af inp1ts s_l
_s fextiliser and Insecticic_esas well as cash. The _m_l interest c_ M-99
loans is 14 pexeemt, su_sg_ntlally balc_ both inforsal _ rates and the
_cial ratea o_ _ to 25 per_ento
The M-99 program increased formal credit fo_"ri(_ [_ro_uctionfrom a base
of P300 rail/ionin 1970 to P716 million in 1974 when _00,000 farmers
_ticlpated. Due to repayment difficul_es pr_3ram lendi_ declined to P196
million in 1979, less tha_ the pre-prc_ram legal. Alt/_ 61 percent cf
Central L_zon fan_vs hor_ to meet pro_uctlon cests in 1979, cmly 18
percent received M-99 loans. Tmas it m3ems that _d_eM-99 program pr_ided a
c_e-tlme transfe_ of _ to farmers to help o_.m_x_e the effects c__ the
1974 production shortfall. The apparent decline in the importanc_ of formal
credit is supported by D_vld (1982)_ who reports t_;_ttotal agricultural
pruduction loans ha%_ declined as a percent of _l loans and as a percent of
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_gricultural value adZ_sd since 1970. Because M-99 read_ a small peroentage
of rice farmers, subsidies on credit are not c_si_ in the. following.
a_a/.ysis of incen__i_s.
T_ Effecti%,_ Protection Rate: %_ne _mct of __r_t policy on
'_alue added or _eturn_..to dcmM_stic factors of _rodnction is m_um/red by the
effecti_ _r.otection rate (._R). The EFR is the ratio of _lue a_led in
dmmeetic prices to vml_ added in _3rld _Tioe.g, minus one. Government
subsidies c_ irrigation in'_estment and _tion are the only way in _hich
policies increase private profitability in rice ,_r_-tion. O_r price
policies 6b not fair rice producers, as the price of fertili_.ex,
insecticides, mmchinery and fuel are all highest than border prices (Table 4).
T_ese _)iicies are reflected in the. diff_ b_tweeD _ for rainfed ar_.
irrigated systems (Table 5). The E_R for rdi_ed sys%_ms i_ -4.7 percent and
is less than the N_R of. -2.0 for 1979. _n_ment _t price policies
f_-t_°er reduoe ineenti_ for rainfed farms and there are no benefits from the
irrigation mmbsidy on these, f_s_ Irr.iga'_l systems ha%_ _lightly positive
pr_ction of 3.6 percent, sh_wing that irrigation m/bsidie_ mDze than _ffset
the n_gati_ effects of low Input and pr_c_ prices..
Incenti%_8 for rice producers havre d_clined in the late 1970s: but these
disfx_rtions in inoentives are relati_ely _iI _cm[m_re_ to _%er distortior_
in the _oc#mny. T_e EPRs for rice are v_ry ci_._e to zero, and th_s &T(m_th in
pr_.ion has occ_._d without any greys distorticr_ in net i_nti_es.
Government policies ha_ favored irrigated pr__rs sliqhtly and ha_
increased irrigated area. Other 9Dw_rs_nt pri_ policies h_ve t_,
predators t_ benefit consumers and domestic manufau_urers of agrica_.t_xai
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7able 5, Kstimates of effective protection rate on rice pgod_ti_, Centre!
Luzon, 1979 wet seas.:m_
Effective
'Type of cropland System a Power source for __ protection
',Land. Y_rreshing rate
•preparat ion (%)
Rainfed i _rimal B;in_ai -4.6
2 _im_l _k._.chine(tilyadora b). -4.9
Irrigated
One-rice crop 3 Animal Manual I 4.9
4 Animal. Machine (tilyadora °') _.8
Two-rice crop 5 Tractvr Manual 2.7
6 Tractor Machine _s_Iz axial 2.6
flow)
7 Tractor .+ Manual 3.5
animal c
g Trac=or • M;_ehine (small axial 3.3
•ani_m Ic flow)
Average :
Rainf ed -4.7
irrigs ted 3,6
Overa iI i°5
aone-crop irrigated and ra_nfed _arms tend to use animals for land preparation
but most two_.crop rice far_,_ u_e trac_or._sbecause they reduce the turnaround
t.imebetween crops. It is equa!lly common f.or threshing to he done man_!ly
or by larga maahines on rainfed a_d c_.e,.._.eropfar_. Two-crop farms thresh.
by hand or with swall axial flow threshers• because of the difficulty of
bringing large machines into the.wet fields between crops (Cordova et.al. 19_I).
bLarge mechanical thresher.
CTractors for primary tillage, plowing o:_ _'otovation and animal for fi,mi
harrowing before transplanting_
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_nputs. In spiteof t/_se unfa_._].e pri<._, yiel._ ,_ _'_X_'uc_ion..have
continued to grow in all envir_hg __ of continuing in_rfovem_nts in
r!ce varieties.
Sc_ial [r_tit_zbility in ,_,,'cg.._P,rc_d__-tuiol_
Rice production is socially profitahl_ if the social cost of dumestic
factors used in production is less than the foreiqn exctmnga earned. The
dcm_stic r_ cost ratio (DRC) msasure,_ the va,i_ of._stic resources
ncz@ed to produce one 6bllar's _r_/% of rice. It is the r_Cie of dumestic
factor costs to value added in world prioss. _t%_ the _ is less than the
shadow exd%ange rate, the activity is socially _ofit_bi_e_ 5
All the Central Luzon rice f_%rming systeh_ are s_zialiy profitable in
1979 (Table 6). The e_tJ,[ated B_Cs are he/Low the shadow exchange rate of
P8.856 per U3 dollar. 6 Differences in the ERCs am gr_._roduction systems are
not large, l%ice produc_ior_ on J,rrigated farms is a slightly more efficient
foreign exdla_e earner hlk_n pr_tion cn rair_._d farms, because the higher
yield on irrig_,_d farms re_ilts fn _ ic_r prague:riot cost per unit of rice.
Rainfed systems are quite c_titive _cial]& _ _it/_ irriga_ _ystems,
hawev_r, because their costs are lower. _ de.cr_,_;eJn vie/d betwe_
irrigated and rainfed farn%s is 45 perceJ_t_ _ut t_ increase in the a_'age DRC
fram 6.52 to 6.86 is only 5 percent.
A cc_:8rison of these results with the _Jardt a.n_Jlacgina (1976) estimate
_s how technical cbange has altered c_rati_ advantage in the 5 years
f_m% 1974 t_ 1979. T_ey esti_reted sncial i:rofi_bility for Cemkral Luzon
farms using both tractor and _rahao for land _&'ep_,.--ation_.n4_larg_ scale
TabLe 6. Sus_nary of. domestic t_:_source cost (_mponeL'_ts i_ ri_:e p[od_%ction, eight systems, Central L_._Jn,
1979 wet season,
Svstem Yield _ Domestic Criticai
' milled Produotien costs b/ l_ktg" cost.! / resource minimum ,
rice_a_/ Domestic Foreign (P/rot) costs d/ world _r'J.ce/
Ra in fed
I Animal/_fanual 1.31 I_539 227 268 6.94 205
2 Animal/FLachine 1.31 1,45i 277 26_ 6.78 20i
Irri_ated one_c roF "
3 Animai/Manua I 2.42 i, 477 290 268 6.93 209 -!
4 _imal/Machine 2.42 i,389 316 268 6.68 202
Irrigated two-cro__
5 Trac_p_/Manual 2.57 1,326 379 268 6.65 204
6 Tractor/Machine 2.57 1,237 407 268 6.38 197
7 Mixed/Ma_ua] 2.57 1,344 335 268 6.56 200
8 Mixed/Maahine 2.57 i_254 363 2-58 6.29 193
_/Based on a milli_g recovery rate of 0.65.
b/
-- _ee Appendix Tables 3 and 4.
£/Z5% of ex-farm prices.
_/Based on FoO.B. price of $291/mtj the average e_port unit price for the period 1978-Z980; official
exchange rate of PT.38/US$_
_/At: which DEC equals shadow exchange rate of _8.856/US9.
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ramie Changes in social cosT:s and returns in rice production.
1974_ _ 1979_/
Foreign Domestic Total Foreign Domestic Total
_ee_ 88 88 109 37 14b
_and _reparation 83 143 226 95 322 417
_rrigation 366 653 1019 288 575 863
Fertillzer i77 68 245 257 37 294
Chemicals 29 29 50 iii 16 127
Pre-harvest hired
labor 205 205 205 205
Interest 66 119 185 154 154
Threshing a__d
harvesting 35 258 293 72 476 548
Family labor 225 225 344 344
Land rent 800 800 1058 1058
Total costs per
hectare 756 2588 3344 932 3224 4156
Yield _/ 2.00 2.57
Cost/ton 378 1294 1672 363 1254 i617
Marketing 6 484 268
_orld price (S/ton) $350 $291
DRC! I
mt respective
world prices 6..02 6.29
a$ 1979 worid
price 7.44 6.29
Sources: Herdt and Lacsina (1976) and Table 6_ Appendix Table 4.
_/Tractor and carabao used for land preparation. Threshing by tilyadora
°/Tractor and carabao used for land preparation. Threshing by small
axial-flow machine.
c/
Tons milled rice per hectare.
q/Foreign costs converted at official exchange rate of PT.0/US$ in 1974
al_0 _7.4/US$ in 1979.
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_'_the long man, and thus Philippine oom_mrative _ is quite 10bust
_ith respect to wox_id.price.
Chencj_ in yields and costs affect the _ocial pr_fitabili'tyof pzo_cing
t3nem_rginal increment of rice.. C_ti_ed grow%l_h_ domestic demand will
_aise domestic prices ahov_ _rld _ric__s_nless tl_re is £_0cthergrowth in
_on. If a-_tional gzo_uh in prod_z_tionis not _ocially profitable,
the country wil/ l_se its _rati%m advantage. Teere are two _ys in _hich
ac]clitionalri_ can be produced if .yieldsdo not co,tinue _o _r_. Ac%_litional
_ainfed _ o_n he b_t int_ _ion or a4_litiona!in%_e_uents in
irrigation cmn raise yields. It is useful to oonsider the_social costa of
increasing rice output in these tmo _ys.
l_/nfe_ rice prc_lu_tionin O_tral iazon is only m_mlly privately
profitable. Ret_n%s to family labor in minfed systems are less than the
m_z_et rate for _ired labor. E_n _ ralr/ed _ in Oemtra! L_mn is
more _:__ _ban in some other re_lons, labor oos_.sin Om_:zal la_z>nare
higher. Thus these famms can be viewed as representati,._of_he _mu_gi_sl
_hilippine rice farm. As raiDfed sy_ are socially profitable i_ C_tral
Luz_, "a_ditionalproduction on t_infed lam_s is likely to be scxsi._lly
profitable. R_:_nt growth in yields ca r_infed land has in_se_ _ial
p_'ofi_abilityfor t_hisenvironment as well as f_ irrigated isnd. Lncreased
pz_d_tion from this envir_a__nt is now socially competitive _ith increases
from irrigated systems.
Irrigation in%_stment oosts are rising_in the Philippinee beo_se.
additional areas are more diffi_[t t_ izriq_te. Heno_ the cost of obtaining
more production tuhxot_hexpansion of irrigated _i's risi_ also. Kikochi
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:!982) estimates that capital c%%s_ispe_ _ ,hectare irrigated rose to P6660 in
[980. i_ this cost is annualized o%_r 30 years and c_erat/ons costs are
a_, the cDst of irrigation is P1225 pe_ hectare, much greater than the P863
used to estimate the 1979 _RC. _his _dgher irrigation oost raises the DRC to
a.06, so t_'it rice production r_Tains socially profitable. O0nti_ growth
in irrigation costs, _h_wever, could quic_J.y erode l_,ilippine comparative
advantage.
The crm_arison hewn 1974 and 1979 st_w_d the importance of yield
qrowtb in recg/cing s_cial cost_s per unit of output_ Further yield growth can
o_fset the risin_ cost _f irrigation investment, if irrigation costs continue
tm grc_ at I0 parop_t annually and other costs r_main constant, yields will
n_ to grow at least 2.8 percent annually to m_intain c_rrent social
profitability.
Conclusions
Philippine rice pradnction has gruwn rapidly in the 1970s _/ _l_e
c_)untry nc_ _ms an exportable surplus. Gruwth has been due primarily to yield
increases fran nswer mc_exn varieties. Rice varieties released sino8 1976 are
more protractive in all envir_ts bscause they are pest and _iisease
resistmnt and more tolerant of mDisture stress.
Grr_th in production _s been achieved without gross distortions in
production inuenti_s. G_ernment policies have contributed to gr(m_ch
principally through in%_stments in irrigation. Irrigation costs are heavily
_idized hut other price policies re_/ce producer _/_entives. Darestic rice
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orices are slightly below world prices and most inputs are taxed. Policies
_us favor irrigate_ farms over rainfed farms.
Technical c_u_e in Philippine rice production has increased yields and
reduced factor costs per ,unit of output, thereby increasing c_mparati_
advantage_. Rice production is socially profitable in 1979 in both rainfed and
irrigated envir_ts. Future cumparati%_ advantage in irrigated
enviro_ts will _ on the relati%_ growth of yields and irrigation
_n%_stment costs as nnre costly irrigation projects are _n. Rainfed
rice production seems to be socially competitive with irrigated production, so
there may be scope for expansion of rainfed areas instead of irrigation
investment.
Although the Philippines has a cc_uarative advanta98 in rioe, exports
unprofitable for the go%_rnment marketing agency in 1977 to 1979. Two
factors account for the losses on exports. _t control of exports puts
a barrier between domestic markets and _rld m_rket q_ality standards 80 that
___l_rtpricein__ntivesfor qualityare .ot passed_ _ domestic
processors. Profitable exports are the_ limited by inelastic world demand for
low quality Philippine ric_.
In order t_ exploit the country's com_arati%_ advantage Jm rice and
maintmin producer incenti%_s, it is necessary to deval<_ higher quality
processing to meet world standards. %_nmiland produces high quality rice with
similar milling _logy and additional cloning, sorting, and grading. The
cos Ls of these ac_civities need to be ascertained and cum_ared with the quality
premium paid on world markets, hut _nfortunately t/_ preeent study was unable
to obtain t2_ cost information. A rough estimate of the.q_allty premium is
- 26 -
_le differer_e between ti_ T__i 5% pri_ and _3B _it _I_ for Phili_pi_
_xports. This differer_e a_raqed $64 per _,_n in !977 to 1980, Because tot_l
_iiling costs in the Philippines a_raged (x_ly $10 to $25 _ ton in 1978
_IIRRI,1978), it seems li_ely that t_ additio__%i e_sts of sorting _nd _i_l_adi_
_uld _ less t_n the premium. 7 Thus if pr_ivate millers _ere _dlcm_d
export, they m_9,11d be able to respo_ _ _rld _arket inoentives to produce
and e_%_ort good quality rice at a profit.
If the Philippines has small export s%irpl_es in the c_mlng years it is
essential to provide incentives to dsmestic millers to produoe better quality
rice for exlzort. With the. secn]rity that a dc_estic sarplus provides, it
s.houid be possible to open up exports to t_heprivate trade_ This will reduce
f_ov_r._ment costs, furthex exploit o_rati_ ad_rantag_._and maintain producer
Lnce_'_ti_s.
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i. Domestic pric_s remsined aho_e world l_s in d'_)se years _ich
would hav_ induced imports irl_an open m_rket. !nst_!_d, s_lll quantities of
rice _re exported because the o_ficia/, prioe ceiling had been reached.
2. Part of the reason why both floor and oeilin9 pri_ do not hold at
_e same ti_e is the narrow margin bet__n offici,l! pri__s. _is m_rgin does
not co_r t,he private costs of t_-ade. Governmer_t must re_laos, some. p_rtion of
private trade and subsidize m_rketing in order to hold official prices.
Unnev_hr (1982) for a cQmplete disc_assion of the oosts and i_msct of m_rketing
s_idies.
3. Differe_t _ta sources give oonflicting evidenoe °about the rate of
_rrigated area expansion. NIA data sh_, mn incr,_ase of 6 percent ann_mlly
De_ 1965 and 1980, while BA_x)n data show an increase _ i._ percent
annual].y (I_ARDD 1980; _IIA, vario_ y@ars)_ It is I/kely that smme _x)rtion of
irrigation in_ment improved existing systems.
4. NIA operated gravity systems a_counti_ for o¢_e-t2_ird_ irrigated
area in 1975 (K_i arc/ }_ayami, 1978).
5. Land, labor, and the cost of capital services are domestic fa_r
costs, _ _arMet prices are assumed to represent the _cial opportunity cost
of these factors. Act_ml %_c_ for hired labor are assmmm_ to r_@r,i_!!!_:i!_tthe.
social _ge for both hired and family labor'. Rent p_id hi_'share-tenants -_:,
landlords, about 25 percent of output after _ction of shared input costs,
represents the _adow p_ic_ of land. The,.-_ti_mted value of capital sevices
is the annual _%_preciation of the bord_" pri_e _lacement _lue of the
capit_l asset plus 15 percent ann:_l ine_arest. Dog,tic tx_%sportation arc].
_uldling are a!s_ counted as domestic cests. _il t_-adable inputs a_oe a
foreign exchange cDst and are value4, at border prioes. N@_-tradable inputs,
,_inly irrigation, are _sed into tradable and n_n-t2a_able _¢_,nts,
using, data from Mona (1981).
6. The she_ exchange is estiTe_ at 20 pexoent abo_s "_leo_!_!iclal
exohange rate of 7.38 in 1979 _Medalla, 1982).
7. This assumes __hat discarded brokens _ some economic value. In
Thailand broken_ are sold to the anJaml feeding industry.
_2_-
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Appendix Table !. Characteristics of commonly grown improved varieties.
Variety Year of Growth Disease Insect
release duration resistance resistance
IR8 1966 135 S , S
IR20 1969 130 MR $
IR36 1976 II0 R R
IR42 1977 140 R R
IRS0 1980 105 R R
IR52 1980 115 R R
IR56 1982 ii0 R R
S = susceptible
MR = moderately resistant
R = resistant
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Appendix Table 2. EstimaLes of government subsidy on. national and com_Lunai
gravity irr_.gation systam_ Cent_l Luzo_, 198.0 prices.
Nationa];_ / .C0mmun_ii/
i. Annualized capital investment cost
(_/ha)_ / 667 812
Opera_ion and maintenance cos_ (P/ha) 211 ._7,_
Total annualized cost (_/ha) 87g 889
2. NiA-charged irrigation fee
Palay (cavans/ha) £/ 7.0 7.0
Value _dl (P/ha) 374 314
Actual NIA collection _e/
Palay (cavans/ha) 2.24 1.40
Value (@/ha) 120 75
•3. Percent subsidy on gravity
irrigation based on:
NIA - cha_ged irrigation fee 57 58
Actual NIA collection 86 92
i/With reference to San Fabian River irrigation System for national gravity
sys=em .and _o an average of four comm_unal gravity irrigation Systems in
Central Luzon for the communal syste_n.$
_/Based on i5% interast rate, 60 years life spa_ _er dam_. 30 years for
canal, and i5 years for pump at_ e_gine. I_itial figures are based
O_ Moya (1981).
_/2.5 cavans/ha for wet season aud 3,5 cavans/ha for dry season.
Appe.radix Table 3. Far__ner'scosts of rice Production in Central Luzon, eight sy_ste_, 1979 wet season.
i'Land lrri_- Ferti- l[_ecti- Ot_%er pre-. Total Interest Harvest- Famil_, Lanll .
System Total Seed-a/ prepaL_.7 tion_; iizerd--/ aides and harve.__t pre- on pre- ing and !abor_" ren_ /
' ration_b/ herhiei_les hired / h_ _¢est harve_ _brewh-
labor---' cos ts cests-t./, inggl
Pesos-.per heat are
I 2,3.'_7 106 490 225 51 205 (I ,07 ;._.- _I '559 282 _38
2 2,2O.) 106 4_0 225 51 205 (1,07'7) _i 287 282 538
3 3.p537 109 490 i_'_:0 328 11.3 205 (1,365) 102 .$64 410 996
? _ • 102 531 !_i0 9964 ._,404 i09 490 120 328 113 ,,O_. "_1,365)
5 3,.]38 112 554 120 367 159 .i:.:,95 {i,5.17 ) i.14 705 344 1,O58
6 3,)9_ 112 554 120 367 159 205 <1,5i7.) IJ4 _b_ 344 _,0_8
7 3,62._ 112 450 120 367 159 205 (1,4[<3_) lU6 705 344 1,O58
8 3,485 112 45C_ 120 367 159 205 (1,413) 1.06 564 _44 1,058 ,
a/V/_luec_ a_ 150_<_[of p_lay price received..
_ P2_,O,.,_ fo_ har_owing_ _304/h_. Animal-b/For _racto{" (2..wheel) operated farm_ initial ]._nd _._epa__atic-,n_:osted . r:__h-:.
ope_::ated farms req.aired 24.5 maueanimal days (14..5 sr_di0 MAD for initial land preparation _and harr_ing,
respectively), valued at _20/MAD,-
.9/NL_..- charge_°irrisation fee of _..5cave -_s/ha_ wet season.
_,/D_ta source gives only total fertilizer costs. Assumed to.be all urea.
@/oKh_r than hired labor for _and preparation,
_/At 15% per a.n_um, appor_.ioned as o_-igip_l cost_ for _ix months, 7.5%_
_/For man_al threshing and harvesting, i/6 of yie&d; harvesting alone, 1/12 of yield; machine threshing, e eust(_..
fee O_ 5% of yield, All shares valued at Bl,OT/kg.
h[Doem not in_.lude operator's and family labor used in land preparation and threshing and barvesting_ Family
labo_ used it,.the latter were valued a_d entered like hired la5o_ in these o_ration_.
i/25% _._fyieid, valued at _l_07/kg.
Appendix Table 4. Allocation of rice production input costs to domestic and foreign sources, ful1_ o[_raded
assumption, eight systems, Ce_itral Luzon, 1979 we£ season°
Source of Seed Land Irri- Ferti- Insecticides Other pre- Total Interes_ Hat_est- Famil_ Land
cost/ prepa- gation lizar and harvest pro- on pro- ing and labor rent
system Total ration herbicides hired, harvest harvest threshing
labor costs costs
Pesos per hectare
Domestic
1 _,016 35 490 23 5 205 (75_) ?_ 359 282 538
2 I,_O1 35 490 23
- -,- 205 <758) 79 2_4 282 538
3 3,57_ 36 490 575 39 Ii 205 (1350) 154 664 410 _96
4 3,362 36 490 _75 33 iI 205 (1350) 154 452 410 996
5 3,407 37 271 5.75 37 16 205 (i141) 159 705 B44 l_ .
6 . 3,178 37 271 575 37 16 205 (1141) i_9 476 344 I,O58 _
? % _,453 37 322 575 37 16 205 (1192) i54 705 344 1,Ca8
8 3,224 37 322 575 37 16 205 (i192) 154 .476 344 I,O_8
Vor_._.e.i n
i 29_ 103 158 36 (297)
2 _%_53 103 158 36 (297) 33
3 ?03 106 2_ 2.30 79 (703)
4 765 106 28B 230 79 (703) 62
5 975 109 210 288 257 1il (975)
6 1.047 109 210 288 257 Iii (975) 72
7 860 !O9 95 288 257 IIi (860_
8 932 109 95 288 257 Iii "(860; 72
  
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons  
Attribution – NonCommercial - NoDerivs 3.0 License. 
 
 
 
To view a copy of the license please see: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
 
